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Abstract
The first part of this essay provides a brief summary of this journal’s first editorial, which
examined eight needed developments and eight critical contexts for global inquiry. The second
part addresses our expanding circle of ethics, which starts with kin but has gradually increased to
include tribes, states, nations, and even the world. It is our expanding circle of ethics that has led
to a heightened awareness of equality, the product of a noble goal with origins in recent social
justice movements. The aim of this essay is to assert that the field has a promising future by
including both the local and the global, a position that reflects how our own moral sense has
moved beyond kin relations to the entire human family.
Introduction
One of the great pleasures of psychology is that it can reveal our deepest biases and beliefs, a
useful trick for anyone interested in self-improvement. Consider the halo effect. It is a human
curiosity how someone who is handsome or beautiful will be granted more latitude than someone
who is average or ugly. We assume that attractive people are smarter, friendlier, more adept at a
wider range of skills, and even occupy a loftier moral ground. We think these things of beautiful
people not because they are true but because they tap into our own desire for approval and status.
Perhaps most interesting about this bias is not that psychology can reveal its effects or prove that
we like elegance, fitness, or beauty. It is interesting because, despite its obviousness, the fact
goes almost unnoticed or unchecked. You can teach someone all about the halo effect and then
help them try to counter it in everyday life, but it will invariably fail. The halo effect is not only
invisible; it is an agonizingly deep aspect of our psychological makeup that can only be
weakened through extensive education (Kahneman, 2011).
The modern denial of culture suffers from a similar slight, although for different reasons. Ours is
a climate that resists the notion of a common or core set of values and beliefs, an elementary
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form of sociality that might actually permeate a cluster of people in a specific geographic region.
On the one hand, this makes sense because every person has different talents and traits. Any
parent with more than one child knows that an instruction manual used for one is unlikely to
work very well for the other. Even identical twins are known to be no more alike as senior
citizens than any other randomly selected pair of people (Harris, 2006). On the other hand,
anyone who has ever left their native land for even a brief jaunt into a foreign culture knows that
some things really are different, even if they are unable to figure out why. This means that
something has to bind people who are unlike us, and the most likely candidate for that is culture.
This essay attempts to upend the problem of why a tacit theory of sociology, even when
acknowledged in secret, is sometimes reviled in public. It is my claim that a sociological theory
of culture is debunked for two main reasons, each of which has a basis in otherwise sound ideas.
This essay examines these two problems by first recapping our journal’s inaugural editorial. That
introduction outlined eight needed developments and eight critical contexts for global inquiry, all
of which have been stunted because of two main reasons. The first of these is best understood
through what is now known as our expanding circle, which has seen our radius of reciprocity go
beyond kin to now include friends, colleagues, groups, tribes, states, nations, and even the world.
The second is a fear of inequality, a predictable offshoot of societies that nurture the ethical
doctrine of the expanding circle. Many well-intentioned scholars deny a sociological theory of
culture because they worry it will descend into mere stereotype. There is little doubt that the
conditions that set in motion an expanding circle are firmly entrenched in otherwise profound
ethical goals. But taken to a logical end, they result in anxiety and fear about how best to work in
a global context. In fact, my goal is to convince you of this point through simple but often
overlooked theories of human sociality.
State of the Field
The inaugural issue of this journal featured an introduction by its founding editor that outlined
eight needed developments and eight critical contexts for global inquiry (Thatcher, 2010). The
aim of these developments and contexts was to call for engagement and participation, an attempt
to incite involvement from the larger global community. The call was meant to address a few
outstanding concerns of the field and its implications for a global audience. At the root of these
differences is a fundamental aspect of what makes different groups of people tick, a need to
acknowledge such differences, and to then fold them within our best practices and research
methods. The hope is for these recommendations to serve as a springboard for future work, in
either agreement or conflict. Here are those eight developments and eight critical contexts.
The first needed development is to move from the local to the global. As Thatcher documents,
the vast majority of intercultural research takes place within the perspective of equality matching
and not communal sharing (2010). This is an important point because if a researcher is
attempting to understand another culture, one that may or may not be individualistic in nature,
then such a method is likely to be informed by her cultural context. That is, if a researcher hails
from a culture that cultivates equality matching and she studies one that prefers communal
sharing, then her methods and results are likely to reflect a local way of viewing the world. A
researcher may think she is doing international or global research by virtue of having crossed an
international border, but if her lens is primarily X then she will view Y as though it is or should
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be X. Such practices may be sincere in an attempt to strive for a global framework but will suffer
the consequences of having remained local.
The second development is moving beyond monocultural methods. Again, if a researcher
assumes a framework based on equality matching as an ideal, then that is going to inform
everything from the hypothesis to the kinds of questions asked, data collected, and even its
analysis. The real problem, though, is that it affects one’s philosophical worldview. In the jargon
of research, this can mean anything from logical positivism to social construction. But in terms
of the field’s current status, it more often means neocolonialism, orientalism, and ethnocentrism,
philosophies that depend on equality matching at the expense of communal sharing.
A third development is a willingness to act on a global framework by not reflexively invoking a
method that emphasizes equality matching. Instead of assuming that all cultures want to be
individualistic, or that they should be studied in this way, it is far more fruitful to think of
cultures as equal but different. This very notion hits at the heart of the entire problem because it
is based on the assumption that equality must be analogous to sameness. In terms of logic, this is
known as a fallacy of equivocation because it confuses one thing for something else despite all
evidence to the contrary. According to this line of reasoning, one should not compare an apple
and an orange because the very act of comparison will elevate one over the other. While this can
certainly happen, it can only take place if one is willing to slide down a dangerous slippery slope.
Even though one is an apple and the other is an orange they are both, after all, just fruit.
Similarly, the fourth needed development is moving from equality matching to multiple levels of
analysis. One way to study culture is to systematize it, not because societies abide by a set of
discrete physical laws but because of the utility of such an approach. It is crucial to not merely
zoom in and out of a given culture to understand it at its many levels, but to also see how one
part also affects other parts. This perspective can only take place if researchers extract
themselves from the perspective of equality matching.
The fifth point is a call for basic quantitative literacy. The majority of scholars interested in this
journal come from some kind of a humanities background. Despite the many advantages of
learning about human nature through language, literature, literacy, and linguistics, these
disciplines are not always quick to use a range of analytical tools. In fact, most research methods
currently in use embrace only one end of the continuum. At the far end sits ethnography, which
is a research method popularized by anthropologists in the early 20th century to help study
foreign cultures. Its methods are not overtly systematic, requiring little more than a pen, paper,
and a willingness to live among an indigenous population long enough to write a paper, thesis, or
book. Hypotheses, research questions, pilot studies, formalized methodologies, data
triangulation, and debriefing are not commonly part of ethnographic research.
This is entirely fine, of course, until scholars borrow these methods to study phenomena for
which a fair amount is already known. Instead of using a more rigorous qualitative methodology,
or even a quantitative one, scholars have typically borrowed anthropological methods without
actually visiting a foreign culture. Ethnographic methods are only useful in new and novel
situations, something that is hard to find these days. It is quite possible that a continuation of
these methods prevail because there is so little quantitative literacy in the field and even less
desire to self-correct.
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The sixth needed development calls for humility, reflexivity, and flexibility. This might be good
advice for many of us, but it certainly applies to researchers who believe that culture should be
examined from one and only one perspective. Humility helps provide a realistic assessment of
our place in the world, reflexivity the ability to act on it, and flexibility the skills to adapt as
conditions change. This point cannot be understated because most intercultural conflict takes
place somewhere along these three points. Flexibility is arguably the most important of the three
because, in abundance, it can help weather problems of humility and reflexivity. Regardless of
their relationship, the advice is not only good in life but is actually critical in terms of culture.
The seventh is a need for effective theory and practice. This is of such special importance that it
is difficult to summarize in a single paragraph. Most readers of this journal are comfortable with
and probably enjoy negotiating the complexities of theory, a pleasure not enjoyed by everyone.
Theoretical inquiry takes place through abstraction, an ability to see how two or more parts
might fit together within a larger sphere of knowledge. While there will always be a need for
pure theorists, we also need people who can apply these ideas to practical situations. The
difference between theorists and those who apply its ideas captures the essence of how one group
of people study culture in terms of equality matching and another group studies culture in terms
of comparative frameworks.
The last needed development is a workable ethics that can be used in a global context. An ethical
system based on subjective opinion of highly localized context might be theoretically
advantageous but will fail to meet the test of application within a global framework. As will be
addressed in the following section, all neurotypical people are endowed with an innate moral
sense that must adapt to the demands of a given situation. This does not mean that ethics is a
subjective affair, only that life is a complex theatre of human activity.
Thatcher goes on to illustrate how these eight needed developments can and should be examined
in eight critical contexts, although he points out many more. The eight that he lists include
second language studies and neuroscience, information technology, organizational behavior and
global relations, distance education, legal traditions, health literacy, instructional design, and
intercultural curriculum and research. In each of these endeavors, there is a need to study not
only ways in which theory may arise and then explain these problems but also how these same
ideas can be put to good use.
All of these obstacles are based on two key social movements. The first of these is what
philosopher Peter Singer has coined the expanding circle. Ours is a species that has an innate
capacity for kin reciprocity in which we share a close bond with members of our family. This is
an important point to make because the same cannot be said of colleagues, acquaintances, and
strangers. There has to be some kind of reason why we clog the airports every holiday. For
various reasons, we have pushed the boundaries of kin relations to also include members of the
group. We are much more likely to do favors for close friends than for someone who resides
outside of the group. Singer argues that this is not an innate urge, like the one for family, but one
based on the elements of sociality and a higher level of reason (2011).
The second movement is what I call a fear of inequality, which has roots in obviously good and
upstanding views about how different people should be treated. The problem is that the drive to
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treat other people fairly does not come as naturally as our own family. The first question that
should pop up in such a situation is why this should be the case and how it effects work in the
field. The moral implications of how we arrived at fearing inequality must first begin with how
we ever reasoned our way into an expanding circle of moral reciprocity.
The expanding circle
In 1981, Australian philosopher Peter Singer wrote a book called The Expanding Circle. In it
Singer tried to fold in new research from evolutionary psychology and, in particular, E. O.
Wilson’s landmark work Sociobiology. One of the key points made by Wilson was that the
animal kingdom seemed to betray an unusual paradox. If natural selection is about survival of the
fittest, nasty in tooth and claw, then how is it that altruism can be found in species ranging from
birds to elephants to humans? It seemed that any organism willing to do a selfless act for another
was hardly doing anything that would help it survive and, quite possibly, might even be
hastening itself to an early grave. Singer reasoned that the answer to this question was neither
exclusively biological nor exclusively behavioral, but a combination of both. Singer set out to
discover the building blocks of what makes people do good acts when there seems to be no
obvious incentive. Resolving this question is not only fundamental for readers of this journal, but
actually sets in place a foundation for figuring out how we got to our hyperactive attention to
equality.
Singer starts off with a few examples from the non-human animal kingdom (we are, after all, just
one mammal among many). Blackbirds and thrushes are known to give out warning calls when a
hawk is seen overhead. These calls presumably serve as warnings for other birds in the area but
also seem to come at some cost. Any time a bird gives out a warning, it does so at an increased
risk of being eaten. Although these calls are more difficult to locate than others, they surely put
birds at greater risk than merely hiding among branches. Singer starts off by asking why birds
would bother doing such a thing when it seems to confer no advantage and considerable
disadvantage. He then goes on to list other animals such as wild dogs, gazelles, elephants, and
other primates that also show acts of altruism with no obvious expectation of reciprocity. There
is even the curious act of when animals forego a chance to kill a rival. Singer notes that a wolf
who admits defeat will bear the underside of its neck in deference to his victor, who could but
does not inflict a final lashing. If the victor is from the same social group, he will simply leave
without a kill.
The origin of our altruism begins with kin, the bonds that bind our closest relatives. Its logic is
defined not by what is best for the group, a common misunderstanding, but by what is best for
our genes. This is because your children possess roughly fifty percent of your genes, your
siblings possess fifty percent of your genes, and their children possess twenty-five percent of
your genes, and so on. Devotion to your children and the odds that you would risk your life for
theirs is not based on their charming smiles or aptitude for music or mathematics. It is because
they share roughly fifty percent of your genetic makeup; they are vessels for passing on the
family line. When you die, you can rest assured that a sizeable part of your genetic information
will be passed onto future generations. In some biological way you are helping obtain a degree of
immortality, a fact that helps explain the source of your moral impulse.
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The link between evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, and ethics is obviously more
complicated than this. We care for and do generous acts for non-kin because we like them, want
to see them do well, share some view for how the world works, and enjoy an inexplicable
connection. Even though we share no genetic bond there is another kind of link, that of
friendship. But according to Singer, we have not stopped at the boundary that encapsulates
family and friends. Our moral radius has gradually pushed farther away to also include tribes,
groups, clans, states, nations, and even the entire planet. This might seem like an odd claim
because there is no reason to believe that we have an innate tendency to care sincerely for
strangers on the other side of the globe. If Singer is right then how can this be and why?
According to Wright, three key traits in our species helped perpetuate the expanding circle
(1996). They include cognition, language, and an emotional repertoire. Cognition refers to an
ability to abstract through intuitive theories about how the world works. Each of us has an
intuitive notion of “objects, forces, paths, places, states, substances, and other people’s desires
and beliefs” (Pinker, 2010). We can take these abstract ideas to the natural world, use them to
solve problems, scale up to higher levels of abstraction, which can then be used to solve even
more difficult problems. The ability to coopt intuitive theories for solving problems is one sign
of intelligence that leads to even higher levels of abstract problem solving, traits that would have
been selected for by filling a cognitive niche (Pinker, 2010).
Wright then goes on to argue that another reason for our expanding moral radius is because of
our species’ knack for language, which is distinct from communication. Language may be
defined as the ability to take a finite inventory of words and string them together in a nearlyinfinite array of combinatorial sentences. This is distinct from communication, which is the
ability to convey an intentional signal to another organism without the benefit of recursion. Birds
may be the most familiar example of a species that can communicate, but only outside the limits
of language. Even bacteria communicate, but only on a chemical level. Most people rarely stop
to think about the miracle of language, but just imagine what life would be like if you forever
lost this basic skill. But perhaps the most important aspect of language is that it has the ability to
explode individual knowledge. I can give you some of my fruit and fish but I can also use
language to explain how you can get even more.
The third and final reason moral sentiments have expanded our circle is because of a heightened
emotional repertoire. This refers to a theory of mind, which is the ability to intuit the thoughts,
values, feelings, and beliefs of other minds. Compared to other primates, we are a highly social
species that must figure out how to negotiate a vast and sometimes complex network of
individual minds. Evidence for this is found not only in the complex plots of our poems,
literature, and movies but also in the thickness of our neocortex, which is directly related to
sociality (Dunbar, 1998). An emotional repertoire also gives us the option of viewing the world
through different eyes. If you are in conflict with someone, then it may be easier to disarm the
situation through empathy, the ability to understand another person’s perspective.
These three aspects of our species’ makeup—cognition, language, and an emotional repertoire—
help explain how we expanded our moral circle to go beyond the boundaries of kin and even
close friends. But we have not simply expanded our moral circle to embrace people unlike us; we
have also curtailed rates of violence. Some people find this to be a difficult idea to accept,
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although the data is clear. Whether it is measured across centuries, generations, or decades, rates
of violence have been declining steadily in nearly every corner of the globe.
The rise and consolidation of nation states first set this remarkable fact in motion. Although it
may seem to confound existing notions of how violence might decrease, it is actually beneficial
if an overarching presence can police a region. Over time we saw a humanitarian revolution in
which various forms of corporal punishment were abandoned, such as the global trend in
eliminating the death penalty for non-lethal crimes. There was also the human rights revolution,
which saw a host of social improvements. Vulnerable populations such as racial minorities,
women, children, homosexuals, and even animals have been rightfully granted equal rights, first
in theory but eventually and over time in practice. Statistical rates from around the world indicate
an expanding circle through a reduction in hate crimes, racist attitudes, an increase in women’s
rights, a reduction in domestic violence, better treatment of children, the decriminalization of
homosexuality, and even animal rights. This last improvement can be seen in revised handling
practices, an increase in vegetarianism, and even the oversight of animal welfare on the sets of
blockbuster movies (Pinker, 2011).
Of special interest to readers of this journal is a much broader reason for why rates of violence
have declined, and that is international trade. This may seem the least likely of explanations for
our expanding moral circle and why you have a smaller chance of being murdered today than at
any other time in recorded history. Yet, there is a very good reason why it makes sense. It is
relatively easy to imagine killing someone with whom you do no business, as there is no mutual
interdependence. But the moment you begin trading with an adversary, the odds of either of you
killing the other drop dramatically. A common example of this anxiety is found in the difference
between the US and China, with some people fearing that China will present an overbearing
threat to the US and its allies. China’s burgeoning space program, spy satellites, and military
arsenal would seem to suggest a serious threat to western countries. Although theoretically true,
the activation of this impulse seems farfetched. We owe China an awful lot of money, and they
make all our stuff. Launching missiles at each other is not an especially useful business plan.
This provides further proof that our circle has not only expanded in a qualitative sense; it has
also improved quantitatively. The expanding circle that Singer presciently derived over thirty
years ago is not just about bringing more people into an orbit of ethics but of also improving
those principles already in place. Our gift for higher order thinking, language, and a sophisticated
emotional repertoire gives us the means to break free from a circle of kin to a much larger sphere
of sociality. But important as they are, groups do not provide the ultimate solution.
Fear of inequality
The fear of inequality begins not with the individual but with a natural desire to form groups,
extends into the goal of keeping unwanted people out, and is reinforced through observations
that are elevated to stereotype. Although its logic is bolstered by social pressures, its motives are
innate (Hammond & Axelrod, 2006).
Despite the odds that most people strive to be free of dependence and control, there is little
question that our species has an innate drive to form groups (Axelrod, 1986). Social groups are
the foundation of our personal and professional lives. Even the most independent among us must
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acknowledge that we get something useful out of friends and family. There is no society on the
planet that fails to value the formation of groups, as it is impossible to think of other people
without also thinking about how they fit into a larger social order. This is not to say that groups
just expect people to be mindless clones. In fact, the institution of groups have to exploit a
number of tricks to keep people from defecting, as anyone familiar with indoctrinations, rites,
and rituals can attest (Atran 1998).
Perhaps the best known example of how people will happily join a group, no matter how
arbitrary, occurred in the Riceville, Iowa classroom of Jane Elliott. The story takes place in April
of 1968, right after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. She was unsure of how to explain
the loss of King, a difficulty made more apparent by the fact that Riceville was an all-white
town. She decided to separate her students into two groups, one with blue eyes and other with
brown. She explained how people with brown eyes were superior to people with blue eyes. All of
the students with blue eyes had to sit at the back of the classroom. Students with brown eyes
were told they were smarter, had more time to play at recess, were fitted with a collar so they
could be identified at a distance, and were instructed to avoid socializing with blue-eyed
students. The result was swift and shocking. Students with brown eyes became mean and
discriminatory, even to the point of dissolving long-standing alliances and friendships. The
following day Elliott decided to try another test, this time telling the class she was all wrong
about eye color. It was not brown-eyed people who were superior, but people with blue eyes.
This had an equal but opposite effect. Fifteen years later students from Elliott’s class were
interviewed for a PBS special where it was said that this experience was the single most
important learning event of their lives. The power of groups can be strong.
The fear of inequality begins not with a few bad apples but with our very own species. There was
nothing unusual about Elliott’s class. While her students attended an all-white school in rural
Iowa, that does not explain the results. The problem is that we are, as a species, wholly vested in
delineating one group of people from the next and then making sure others stay out of our group.
While some groups cultivate values that make them more insular than others, the problem is
actually far deeper. There is simply not enough time or resources to befriend everyone, which
means we have to pick and choose. This trial-and-error process is not an environmental offshoot
of a social motive but a deep instinctual trait. In terms of nature and nurture—and it is surely a
combination of both—there is little doubt that evolution has stamped our species with a taste for
ethnocentrism (Axelrod, 1986; Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). We expect our independence but
relish the safety of groups, and that means keeping others at bay.
The traits of ethnocentrism are defined by a range of behaviors that can be easily observed. Such
variables may include appearance, ornamentation, politics, socioeconomics, religion, and even
language and accent. The pursuit and maintenance of ethnocentrism is thought to place
significant cognitive demands on a person, as there is a linear link in primates between degree of
sociality and thickness of neocortex (Dunbar, 1998; Hammond & Axelrod, 2006). While there is
little controversy in the claim that social and cultural inputs greatly affect the nature of
ethnocentrism, there is extensive evidence supporting an innate predisposition for in-group
behaviors. This turns out to be true even in the absence of direct environmental pressure or when
the group is merely abstract. It is not simply the difference between brown and blue eyes; it can
be about people and traits we have never before seen.
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Communal sharing
Although group membership confers a number of advantages, it also comes at some cost. In fact,
joining and maintaining membership in a group typically requires a series of endless costs that
are most noticeable at the beginning. There is also an extraordinary range of groups with which
to participate, including family, education, health, recreation, and religion. Regardless of the
group, all are guided by a core set of principles that reflect and reinforce their dynamics. They
start off with trying to figure out what other people think. This extends into solving practical and
existential problems reinforced through social rituals that are exploited through several cognitive
quirks (Fiske, 1992; 2004).
A theory of mind is what neurotypical people use when they try to infer the thoughts, values,
feelings, and beliefs of other minds (Atran, 1998). Taken to one end of the spectrum, a theory of
mind is the same cognitive faculty used to infer the presence of souls, gods, and spirits (minus a
material body). A second feature of group membership is that it provides a number of benefits
typically unavailable to individual people by helping solve a number of practical and existential
problems. Practical problems may include hunting, gathering, and forming friendships and
alliances. Groups can also help solve existential problems, especially when the practical fails. If
science, law, and medicine are unable to grant certainty, then perhaps one can appeal to a higher
authority. The third feature of group membership is that it often deals in matters that can be
neither proven nor disproven. If a practical or existential matter appeals to no empirical proof
then ceremony may be useful. Ceremony and commensal meals create a sense of social cohesion,
a goal that can be solidified by people willing to endure great costs such as sacrificing animals,
crops, and foreskins.
The fourth and final feature of group membership is that is takes place by exploiting a series of
cognitive quirks. The first of these is that it creates a sense of social cohesion. Families might be
the prototype of group membership. Even though “you can’t choose your family,” there has to be
some reason why people clog the airports around the holidays every year. Many people willfully
visit their families on a fairly regular basis, even if begrudgingly, while the same cannot be said
of colleagues, acquaintances, or strangers. The fact that non-kin relations do not enjoy the same
family bonds helps explain why colleagues and acquaintances have to construct a series of
rituals. To cite a religious example, the words “brethren,” “brother,” and “our father” seem
designed to solve this very problem.
Communal sharing is exploited by a second cognitive quirk, that of celebration. Birthdays,
anniversaries, religious rites and rites of passage, initiations, judicial proceedings, and
educational achievements are all examples of human endeavors that attempt to exploit a drive for
communal sharing. A third cognitive quirk is ritualistic motion. Sports, medical procedures, and
religious events all attempt to create a sense of communal sharing through ritualistic motion. In
religious ceremonies, members of a church may stand, sing, and wave their hands in unison.
Individual worshippers become submerged in the movement of the group. This is analogous to
other behaviors seen in the animal kingdom, such as the V formation of birds. Unified movement
that reinforces communal sharing takes place in many organisms or people who attempt to
replicate the benefits of a single superorganism.
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The fourth and final cognitive quirk exploited in the name of communal sharing is self-sacrifice.
Because group membership confers a number of advantages it is important to weed out
defectors, and one way of doing that is to erect obstacles or tests that only the dedicated are
likely to satisfy. A player who regularly takes his last foul for the team, a soldier who charges the
enemy line, and a mother who offers her son’s foreskin are all examples of the kinds of sacrifice
required to gain admission into and remain a member of a group.
The point is that communal sharing or in-group membership succeeds only because it requires its
members to find a common bond, and few bonds are stronger than identifying how others are
different. While societies have to deploy a number of tricks to get people to buy into group
membership, it is hardly a monumental request. People who decide to go alone do so under
tremendous uncertainty and the possibility that plans will not unfold in their favor.
Equality matching
If group benefits occupy one elementary form of sociality, then its inverse is equality matching.
Although it is possible to collapse both values onto a single scale, it can also be useful to treat
them as mutually exclusive. Unlike communal sharing, whereby the individual is absorbed
within a group, equality matching is concerned with autonomy and fair treatment. Its logic is
defined by a need and desire to contribute and distribute resources equally, a strong moral
impulse for individual freedom, personal opinion, and the free-flow of ideas. If communal
sharing is about making sure people conform, then equality matching is about figuring out how
best to persuade.
One way to think about the difference between communal sharing and equality matching is
through a third form of elementary sociality—authority ranking (Fiske, 1992; 2004). All
societies have a social physics in terms of space, time, magnitude, and force. Each of us occupies
a finite amount of space, proceeds through it at a particular rate of time, is in possession of a
given magnitude, and is capable of a certain amount of force. This means that people higher up
on the food chain tend to be taller or made to appear that way, walk in front of the group instead
of behind, enter first and wait less, and are capable of wielding social, political, financial, or
physical force. A judge, king, or tyrant wears bulky or elaborate attire, is bigger or sits higher,
walks in front or is carried along a procession, and can exercise authority by withholding or
removing resources.
Societies move away from authority ranking and toward equality matching for a variety of
reasons, although one of the most important is socioeconomic. It is helpful to think of the
relationship between socioeconomic status and equality matching as a linear function in which
one increases simultaneously with the other. Consider what happens to a small family that lives
in an even smaller home. Suppose there are six members of the family, two parents and four
children, and a total of only two bedrooms. The master bedroom goes to the parents and the other
goes to the remaining four children. It can be tricky sharing two rooms with six people, so the
family does most of their socializing in the living room where a television and radio are shared.
The smaller physical space means less privacy, independence, and freedom but comes with the
added bonus of stronger family bonds through increased contact time. What happens if this same
family wins the lottery?
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Our family of six and their once-modest income now has the luxury of scaling up to a much
larger home where everyone gets a room of their own, proper furniture, and personalized
entertainment. Because each member of the family has their own space, there is far less reason to
spend time in the living room watching television, listening to the radio, and socializing. The
family has deemphasized its value of communal sharing and reallocated its energies toward
equality matching. A shift from the group to the individual means more privacy, independence,
and freedom but at the cost of weaker family bonds from decreased contact time. This does not
mean that one member of the family will no longer help a sibling or parent, but it does suggest a
weakened link between each of its members. The difference between shared and private rooms is
unlikely to be consequential among kin, although the same could not be said of non-kin.
It is this very dynamic of moving away from in-group preference and toward equality matching
that captures the essence of the fear of inequality. As groups of people acquire greater
socioeconomic wealth, so too does their inclination for equality matching. Less emphasis on
groups and conformity results in greater degrees of personal freedom and non-conformity. The
shift from communal sharing to equality matching is a process that leads to a fear of inequality.
With greater individual freedom comes an anxiety about making sure everyone is equally free.
One way to think of this is to return to our family. Before winning the lottery, the ritual of dinner
was likely to be centered around a shared social experience. Much like societies with strong
values toward communal sharing, our family before the lottery was probably less concerned
about making sure that everyone took an equal amount of food. Instead, meals would have been
seen as a collective experience in which everyone may or may not have invested the same
amount of time, energy, and resources. Meals would have been eaten together in the same room
and at roughly the same time each day. Counter this with what happens when the group is a little
less cohesive, in part because of a larger house, more personal space, and the monetary means to
take care of meals on an individual basis. Instead of a collective experience, everyone is able to
find food on their own terms. This may mean having dinner together, although it is far more
likely that, over time, each person will simply eat according to personal whim and schedules.
Another way to think of how commensal meals can help explain the shift from communal
sharing to equality matching is by looking at these same rituals around the world. In many
societies, the act of preparing, consuming, and ritualizing meals is a central aspect of social life.
French and Italian societies may spend hours with family and friends at any given meal, while
the same cannot be said of Australians or Canadians. There has to be some reason why everyone
collects around a mesab in Ethiopia, eating with their hands from the same enormous platter of
food. While in the US, it is widely known that people are more likely to scream their order into a
plastic clown, exchange money through a small window, and receive their feast in a small paper
bag. This is not to say that mesabs and fast food are the cause of communal sharing or equality
matching, but they are certainly aligned with a larger set of values about the pressures of
conformity versus the effort and anxiety of equality.
Conclusion
In this journal’s first issue, Thatcher presented eight needed developments and eight critical
contexts that can and should be used for global inquiry. Moving from the local to the global,
moving beyond monocultural methods, having the courage to act in a global context, distancing
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ourselves from equality matching to better understand societies that nurture communal sharing,
basic quantitative literacy, a sense of humility and flexibility, effectively applying the problems
of theory to those of practice, and finding a workable global ethic are the eight areas of needed
development.
As Thatcher further notes, each of these problems can be studied in a wide range of affairs. They
include second language studies and neuroscience, information technology, organizational
behavior, distance education, legal traditions, health literacy, instructional design, and
intercultural research. All of these areas can be improved by scholars who maintain the
importance of an expanding moral circle, assuming one avoids taking its precepts to their logical
limit. Equality for every person is a worthy goal that speaks to how far we have come, but it
should also not instill in us an equal but paralyzing fear that the only way to achieve it is through
extreme subjectivity. The modern denial of culture has been a steady work in progress, one that
surfaced from the high ideals of equal rights, social justice, and an expanding moral sense.
Without question, the catalyst for the social relativism of today is rooted in the civil rights
movement, the right of women to vote and attend university, greater understanding of disability,
and the increased awareness of sexual orientation. That our species has identified these
previously overlooked or stigmatized groups of people is a testament to the awesome progress
we have made, with a promise that more success in these areas will follow.
At the same time, a rejection of all innate faculties in the name of equality has led us down a
dark, unproductive, and even volatile path. There is no truth, what is right for me is not for you,
cancer may be genetic but intelligence is not, and even morality is pushed off into an irrational
corner of obscurity. One of the great hallmarks of our recent past was realizing that certain
groups of people are not inferior just because they look different. At the same time, rejecting
fallacious assumptions about the predisposition of certain demographics should not be countered
by an equal and equally absurd assumption that everything is idiosyncratically personal. Just
because our ancestors were embarrassingly wrong about the intelligence and competence of
certain groups of people does not mean that these things are entirely a function of the
environment. This is just sliding down the other side of the same slippery slope. There is good
evidence, in fact, that intelligence has been increasing across the board for decades, that it can be
improved with training, and that a sizeable portion of it is heritable (Harris, 2006). Despite fears
that some people have about appearing daft, it should be entirely respectable to admit that not
everything is decided by environmental proxy.
Such extreme thinking has magnified two intellectual fallouts, a flawed theory of mind and the
fear of inequality. The ability to infer the thoughts, values, feelings, and beliefs of other minds is
one aspect of human sociality. Our ancestors’ ability to guess what other people were thinking
aided them in a wide range of human affairs. Ours is a hypersocial species that deals in such
matters as conflict, cooperation, mind reading, manipulation, coordination, plausible deniability,
rational ignorance, and the cultural transmission of knowledge (Krebs and Dawkins, 1984). We
carry out these aspects of public life through a social physics of space, time, magnitude, and
force. This is especially evident in matters of authority ranking, which is a testing ground for two
other elementary forms of sociality—communal sharing and equality matching. A society’s shift
from in-group preference to equality matching is one that often coincides with greater
socioeconomic prosperity, heightened personal freedom, and equality matching.
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Theory of mind, the expanding circle, and a fear of inequality help explain the problem of why
people confuse a theory of psychology for sociology. An unchecked theory of mind results in the
assumption that other minds want the same thing and are even driven by the same motives and
goals. It is likely that the other minds problem is responsible for considerable
miscommunication, one that gets magnified the instant it crosses cultures. This, in turn, leads to
even greater problems as societies shift toward individual autonomy. The other minds problem is
likely to enhance the predisposition a society may have for equality.
All of this leads toward the dilemma of mixing a theory of psychology for one of sociology.
Psychology deals with individual minds while sociology deals with them as a group. If theory of
mind and a fear of inequality cause one to focus on what each person thinks then that in itself
will lead one toward psychology instead of sociology. This is not to say that an emphasis on
psychology is wrong, only that it is incapable of explaining how large groups of people carry on
with the daily business of life. Getting away from the notion that everything true must also be
subjective is the first step, one that will help us self-correct a different injustice that is our
modern denial of culture.
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